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 1 
Learning from failure? 2 
 Political expediency, evidence, and inaction in global maternal 3 
health 4 
Zubia Mumtaz, Alyssa Ferguson, Afshan Bhatti, Sarah Salway 5 
$NH\FKDOOHQJHLQPDWHUQDOKHDOWKWRGD\LVWKHLQFRQJUXLW\EHWZHHQµVXFFHVVHV¶invariably 6 
reported at discrete program level, and the collective lack of progress in global maternal mortality rates. 7 
Evaluations of large numbers of maternal health projects, worth billions of dollars, consistently suggest 8 
a preponderance of successful interventions.1,2,3,4,5 Yet, 69 out of 75 high burden countries failed to 9 
achieve their MDG-5 targets.6,7 Globally, the 44% reduction in maternal mortality rate from 1990 and 10 
2015, while not insignificant, also fell short of its 75% target. Programs are an important element of 11 
maternal health service delivery, and while they may not be the only factor responsible for reducing 12 
maternal mortality (falling fertility rates, improving education and reducing poverty also play 13 
significant roles), they draw upon considerable resources. When programs do not achieve their 14 
intended impact, they represent lost opportunities.  15 
 16 
Disconnects between discrete program successes and overall failure to reduce maternal 17 
mortality may be explained by a number of factors.8,9 Many programs lack an explicit and credible 18 
program theory describing how the effort is expected to produce the population health effect. 10 19 
Interventions that are deemed successful in one setting are often replicated elsewhere, without taking 20 
into account contextual specificities.11 Or, we suggest, the positive assessments of maternal health 21 
program performance may be flawed and deserve closer scrutiny.  Indeed, other authors have alluded to 22 
simplistically defined indicators of success,12,13 and production of EDGRU³IXGJHG´GDWD.14 23 
 24 
It is well recognized that the global aid architecture is built on a foundation of political and 25 
economic objectives which may or may not align with the true health, and social needs of recipient 26 
countries.15,16,17 Many programs have unarticulated, implicit goals alongside their explicit population 27 
health ones.6 These include, but are not limited to, maintaining positive relationships between donors 28 
and recipient governments, keeping money flowing, and maintaining the appearance of success.10 29 
While implicit goals cannot always be avoided, in some cases they may be more heavily regarded, by 30 
program funders and implementers, than the explicit health goals.10 Here, we wish to document an 31 
experience which sheds light on the central role of these implicit goals, and how when not fully 32 
consonant with more explicit program goals, become barriers to effectiveness. We also highlight how 33 
the current structures of the international aid industry create perverse incentives to hide learning that 34 
could potentially improve interventional approaches.  35 
 36 
Our aim is not to defame or devalue the work or intentions of any organization. Rather, we wish 37 
to highlight existing challenges in documenting and addressing programmatic deficiencies in maternal 38 
health, and learning from failure. We also raise some deeper questions in relation to the current 39 
business of aid. 40 
 41 
The Story 42 
With the objective of providing care to vulnerable rural women, a population that has remained 43 
largely outside the scope of standard maternal health services, the Government of Pakistan introduced 44 
Community Midwives (CMWs), a new cadre of skilled birth attendants. The program sought to recruit 45 
and offer 18 months of midwifery training to young women with 10 years of schooling, who resided in 46 
specific rural areas. The Government did not employ these trained CMWs, but rather anticipated they 47 
would return back to their home villages and establish home-based, private practices that also provided 48 
domiciliary maternity care. The program was designed with the expectation that each CMW would be 49 
recruited from one union council to serve a population of 10,000.18 A union council is the smallest 50 
administrative unit in rural areas. Since 2007, over 8,000 CMWs have been trained.19 51 
Emerging evidence suggests that CMWs have yet to develop into significant providers, with 52 
only 1-3% of rural women reporting use of their care in most areas.20,21  To support these existing 53 
government recruited and trained, but private sector midwives, to become high quality, sustainable 54 
providers, an international NGO, funded by a major donor, developed an intervention aimed at 55 
providing micro-loans and business skills to 90 CMWs selected from three districts - Quetta, Gwader 56 
and Kech,- in Baluchistan province.  Demand for CMW services was to be generated through an 57 
awareness-building campaign using cellular phone SMS technology, DQGZRPHQ¶VVXSSRUWJURXSV58 
Further, access to emergency transport services was to be established by developing a community-59 
managed transport fund. Appreciating the importance of incorporating research in programs at the point 60 
of design and implementation,22,23 the funding agency and NGO commissioned us to conduct 61 
operations research embedded with the NGO initiative KHQFHIRUWKUHIHUUHGDV³Saving Mothers´to 62 
assess: 1) whether these micro-loans enabled CMWs to become financially sustainable, effective 63 
maternity care providers; 2) whether there was an improvement in the coverage of maternal care 64 
services in program catchment areas; and 3) whether an increase in uptake of CMW care could be 65 
atWULEXWHGWRWKH1*2¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQ 66 
 67 
The operations research utilized a cluster quasi-experimental study design. Two out of the three 68 
³Saving Mothers´ project districts, Quetta and Gwader), were purposively chosen for the evaluation. A 69 
cluster was defined as a CMW and her catchment population. We estimated a sample size of 1,520 70 
women in 52 CMW clusters (26 intervention and 26 control) would be required to detect a 10% 71 
difference in coverage between intervention and control clusters ZLWKSRZHUDQGĮ 0.05).  To 72 
collect baseline data, two-stage stratified random sampling was done. We assumed we would find equal 73 
numbers of CMWs in both districts, but in reality, out of a total of 90 CMWs listed in the two districts, 74 
75 were in Quetta and 15 were in Gwader. Stratifying at the district level and using 1:1 ratio, all 7 75 
intervention CMWs and 7 controls (total 14) were selected from Gwader. To achieve the estimated 76 
sample size of 52, 38 CMWs (19 intervention and 19 control) were selected from Quetta. Within each 77 
district, intervention CMWs were randomly selected from the list of CMWs enrolled in the ³Saving 78 
Mothers´ project, and controls were selected from the Government CMW database. Another element 79 
of program design not met in reality was well-defined CMW-catchment areas. To rectify this, we first 80 
defined CMW¶s catchment areas using their addresses (and presumed location of home-practice). 81 
Within these catchment areas, a random sample of 1,521 women who had given birth in past two years 82 
were interviewed using a pre-tested questionnaire. The findings were unexpected. In Quetta district, 83 
85% of respondents reported skilled birth attendance: 72% by a physician, 13% by a non-physician 84 
skilled birth attendant, and only 0.2% by a CMW. In Gwader district, 91% of respondents reported 85 
skilled birth attendance: 57% physicians, 33% non-physician skilled birth attendant and 1.5% CMW.  86 
These rates are in stark contrast to the provincial skilled birth attendance rate of just 18% (14% in rural 87 
and 34% in urban areas).24 88 
 89 
To further understand these data, we geographically mapped all CMWs by their home 90 
addresses, using the *RYHUQPHQW¶V CMW database. As illustrated by a representation in Google Maps 91 
(Figures 1 and 2), not only were the majority of CMWs located in district Quetta, but they were 92 
concentrated in one urban area, Quetta City.  This provincial capital of estimated 1.2 million, is served 93 
by 362 public and private health facilities,25 including major teaching and military hospitals. It became 94 
apparent that almost all midwives who had been trained as part of the GRYHUQPHQW¶VCommunity 95 
Midwife Program to provide rural care, were in fact urban women, often located within higher socio-96 
economic neighbourhoods. The situation proved similar for the 15 CMWs in Gwader district.  97 
 98 
Further analysis and conversations with government personnel and frontline staff of the NGO 99 
suggested the urban concentration of CMWs in Baluchistan was well known, and was, in part, a 100 
consequence of the PLGZLIHU\SURJUDP¶V education pre-requisite of 10 years, a level of schooling 101 
uncommon in rural women. The candidates for the *RYHUQPHQW¶VCMW program were also largely 102 
recruited through social networks of urban, upper-income people already involved in the program, a 103 
practice which has been well documented in literature from Pakistan.26 According to one senior 104 
program manager in the province, over 90% of CMWs were recruited through such nepotistic practices.  105 
 106 
These findings were shared with the implementing NGO. Given the early stage of intervention 107 
roll-out, we advised a reassessment of intervention design. The problem of the urban concentration of 108 
health workers is not unique, and in this case was the result of local patterns of inequities, whereby 109 
resources of all kinds, including female education and income generating opportunities, are often 110 
channelled to advantaged sections of the population. We advised our NGO partners WKDW&0:V¶urban 111 
location would place them in direct market competition with a range of existing government, teaching, 112 
and military hospitals, and well-established non-physician skilled birth attendants. In fact, this market 113 
competition was already occurring. The urban-based CMWs were not working, best indicated by our 114 
survey finding that CMWs attended only 0.2% of births in Quetta and 1.5% in Gwader. Even if some 115 
could establish viable practices with help from WKH³Saving Mothers´ initiative, the geographic and 116 
social location of CMWs made it unlikely that their practices would result in improved access to 117 
maternity care for vulnerable rural women, the stated target of the project. In effect, the design and 118 
implementation of the ³Saving Mothers´ project was reinforcing the already problematic urban/rural 119 
maternal health care inequities in the region. 120 
 121 
The implementing agency (with donor agreement) responded by terminating our contract and 122 
the operations research. At the time of writing, the ³Saving Mothers´ project was proceeding according 123 
to the original intervention plan.  Conversations with colleagues working in similar international NGOs 124 
have suggested that such behaviour is not unusual; that challenges facing projects are often ignored 125 
and/or hidden.6 For example, during the session entitled ³FAIL: First Attempt in Learning ± Learning 126 
IURP:KDWGRHVQ¶W:RUNLQ0DWHUQDODQG1HZERUQ+HDOWK´DWWKH*OREDO0DWHUQDO Health 127 
Conference in Mexico, a resounding majority of the audience admitted to programmatic failures.27 128 
However, when asked who had shared these failures with their funders, all hands went down. Clearly, 129 
despite widespread acknowledgement of the importance of ³OHDUQLQJIURPIDLOXUH´, when push comes 130 
to shove it appears nothing more than rhetoric.  131 
 132 
We believe our experience aligns closely with +RGJLQVDQGFROOHDJXHV¶ analysis of why programs 133 
fail to improve population level health indicators.10 It also aligns with Panter-Brick et al.¶V assertion 134 
that the Global Health community has µEURNHQIDLWK¶ZLWKLWVµFRUHHWKLFDOPDQGDWHWRDGGUHVVWKHroot 135 
FDXVHVRISRRUKHDOWKRXWFRPHV¶28  and Hawe¶V contention that the field has fallen prey to developing 136 
conservative, simplistic, and negligent interventions that remain well short of delivering broad reaching 137 
and sustainable outcomes.29  The Cape Town Statement from the Third Global Symposium on Health 138 
Systems Research and a recent editorial in the WHO Bulletin have called for more embedded research, 139 
starting from the stage of program planning, wherein research that LV³FRQGXFWHGLQSDUWQHUVKLSZLWK140 
policy-makers and implementers, integrated in different health system settings and that takes into 141 
account context-specific factors can ensure greater relevance in policy priority-setting and decision-142 
PDNLQJ´18 In our experience, despite rhetoric calling for closer collaboration, when tasked to explore 143 
such interventions, researchers often face prohibitive challenges to their work, and see their findings set 144 
aside or debated. This is particularly likely when UHVHDUFKHUV¶ILQGLQJV critically illuminate the failures 145 
inherent to poorly designed initiatives, or are suggestive of poor implementation. Contrary to the stated 146 
goals of NGOs and development funding organizations to improve the health of vulnerable 147 
populations, rejecting unwelcome results and continuing to follow poorly chosen program strategies 148 
serves to reinforce the status quo, and further entrench determinants of poor health.  149 
 150 
All this leads us to raise some bigger questions:  151 
 152 
1) How can we ensure our interventions reach those most in need - the voiceless, powerless, and 153 
marginalized? How can we ensure that the powerful ± WKHORFDOHOLWHLQWHUQDWLRQDO1*2¶VDQG154 
donors - do not hijack well intentioned, often tax-payer funded, interventions? In our case, the 155 
key force derailing the project was the unsuitable recruitment of urban, relatively wealthy 156 
women to be trained as midwives. While this was a local problem, the NGO program designers 157 
were apparently not aware of it. When informed, all stakeholders (funders, international 158 
1*2¶VFKRVHWRLJQRUHWKHLQIRUPDWLRQfor distinct reasons of self-interest, thereby severely 159 
hindering WKHSURMHFW¶VJRDORILPSURYLQJPDWHUQDOKHDOWKRISRRUUXUDOZRPHQ. How can we 160 
ensure that the interests of the powerful do not take precedence over improving program design 161 
and functioning for those who are most in need of healthcare?  162 
 163 
2) How can we strengthen accountability structures governing maternal global health practice ± at 164 
every rung of the ladder, from donors/funders, implementing agencies, and researchers, to local 165 
governments? 1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJWKHUKHWRULFRIµHQVXULQJUHVHDUFKLVHPEHGGHGLQSURJUDPV,¶166 
there clearly remains in global public health, an unwillingness to accept, let alone act on, 167 
evidence that disrupts preconceived expectations or challenges insubstantial explanations of 168 
interventions and their outcomes.17 Moreover, powerful decision-makers are not currently held 169 
to account. This further reduces the ability of independent researchers and lower-ranked public 170 
health personnel to speak back against system insufficiencies, inappropriateness, or even 171 
mismanagement.  172 
 173 
3) How can we encourage better practices for identifying, reporting, and addressing context-174 
specific programmatic challenges in on-going and future initiatives?  In this particular case, the 175 
program developers failed to recognize or incorporate local social pressures and political 176 
practices that had the potential to confound success. Instead, shortcomings were ignored, 177 
primarily because the current global funding architecture rewards success, and failures are 178 
viewed as threats to program funding, employment, and institutional sustainability. Funders are 179 
often also complicit in the obfuscation of problematic results for acknowledging program 180 
failure risks being seen as evidence of their µpoor¶ judgement. Researchers and publishers also 181 
contribute to this illusion of success, when they are unwilling to publish negative results. All 182 
these actions (and inactions) serve to hamper genuine program improvement and success.  183 
 184 
These questions suggest the need for a more systematic and thorough exploration of the current 185 
practice of global maternal health, a sharper focus on core values, and demand a deeper accountability 186 
from all stakeholders. We must remain vigilantly aware that the key stakeholders in the global maternal 187 
health industry - poor women in some of the poorest countries in the world ± remain voiceless. A 188 
reversal in the current disconnect between discreet program successes and overall failure to provide 189 
safe childbirth care demands strong leadership, rising above organizational rivalries, and resisting the 190 
current domination of elites. Within this renewal, a commitment to truly ³learning from failure,´ is not 191 
only encouraged, but essential.  192 
 193 
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Figure 1: Google map of Quetta illustrating intervention-and control CMWs and health facilities 205 
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Key: 208 
* Green figures: Control CMWs 209 
* Purple figures: Intervention CMWs 210 
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Figure 2: Zoomed out map of Fig 1.  226 
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